2 edition of Implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy found in the catalog.
Implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy
Roger E. A. Farmer
by Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto in Toronto
Written in English
Bibliography: p. 36.
|Other titles||The effect of interest rates on layoffs.|
|Statement||by Roger E.A. Farmer.|
|Series||Working paper series / Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto -- no. 8210, Working paper series (University of Toronto. Institute for Policy Analysis) -- no. 8210|
|Contributions||University of Toronto. Institute for Policy Analysis.|
|LC Classifications||HD5708.5 .F375, HD5708.5 F375|
|The Physical Object|
|Pagination||36 p. --|
|Number of Pages||36|
Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy: The Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs Review of Economic Studies, , 52, (3), View citations (32) A New Theory of Aggregate Supply American Economic Review, , 74, (5), View citations (29) Bursting bubbles: On the rationality of hyperinflations in. Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy: The Eﬁect of Interest Rates on Layoﬁs," (). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, Third Edition.
In the context of a supplier and a retailer supply chain, the marketing efforts of the retailer have a significant impact on market demand. But due to the asymmetry of information, the supplier can not observe the behavior of retailer, and thus moral hazard may exist, which will affect the coordination of supply chain. Based on this, this paper analyzes the profit games between supplier and. Implicit Contracts Under Asymmetric Information Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart. NBER Reprint No. Issued in November NBER Program(s):Economic Fluctuations and Growth. No abstract is available for this paper. This paper is not currently available on-line. Unfortunately, this reprint is not available on line.
Explicit and implicit contracts with non-financial stakeholders and corporate capital is causally linked to its bankruptcy status, the firm will Arnott and Stiglitz () show that under asymmetric information about job quality, optimal wage structure entails implicit insurance to employees against job dissatisfaction. Allen and Gale. Asymmetric Information, Collateral, and Moral Hazard - Volume 25 Issue 4 - Kazuhiro Igawa, George Kanatas The optimal secured loan contract for higher quality firms is shown to involve overcollateralization. There is underinvestment relative to first best in maintenance of the pledged assets but overinvestment relative to the level that.
mysteries of freemasonry
A vindication of Anne Wentworth
BBC sound archives
Theory, empiricism,and regional economic policy.
law of succession in Uganda
Transduction in biological systems
Statistical analyses of burial customs of the sauromatian period in Asian Sarmatia (6th-4th centuries B.C.)
Issac 98: August 13-15, 1998, University of Rostock, Germany
Color-correct (orthochromatic or isochromatic) photography
Fried, Joel & Howitt, Peter, "Credit Rationing and Implicit Contract Theory," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 12(3), pagesaum, Elie, "Bankruptcy, Warranties and the Firm's Capital Structure," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic.
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW ELSEVIER European Economic Review 40 () Labor and credit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy Theofanis Tsoulouhas * Department of Economics, North Carolina State University, BoxRaleigh, NCUSA Received 15 January ; revised 15 July Abstract This paper investigates the interaction between a firm's contracts Cited by: 6.
Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy: The Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs ROGER E. FARMER University of Pennsylvania This paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors.
Firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of. CiteSeerX - Document Details (Isaac Councill, Lee Giles, Pradeep Teregowda): This paper develops a model in which a firm writes labour contracts with workers and debt contracts with creditors.
Firms have more information than do the owners of the factors of production and they are also subject to limited liability. We show that if the limited liability constraint is binding then the employment.
" Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy: The Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol.
52(3), pages Arnott, Richard J & Hosios, Arthur J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy: The Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs. Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy: The Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs.: The Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs.
Localización: Review of economic studies, ISSNVol. 52, Nº, pág. Idioma: inglés. “Deficits and cycles,” Journal of Economic The 77–88, “Implicit contracts with asymmetric information and bankruptcy: The effect of interest rates on layoffs,” Review of Economic Stud –42, Also, implicit contracts have been playing an important role in explaining credit rationing under asymmetric information.
Implicit contracts under adverse selection. Some argue that the creditor-debtor long term relationship arises from the valuable "inside information" revealed via. In a widely cited paper, Sharpe () has formulated a model of corporate borrowing under asymmetric information which provides a theoretical explanation of long-term bank–firm relationships.
This model has had a large impact in the banking literature and is conceptually important, because it makes a main feature of actual lending relationships amenable to theoretical analysis. Abstract. An implicit contract is a theoretical construct meant to describe complex agreements, written and tacit, between employers and employees, which govern the exchange of labour services when various types of job-specific investments inhibit labour mobility, and opportunities to shed risk are limited by imperfectly developed markets for contingent claims.
Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: a stylized model of continuing relationships Article (PDF Available) February with 2, Reads How we measure 'reads'. Also, implicit contracts have been playing an important role in explaining credit rationing under asymmetric information.
Implicit contracts under adverse selection Edit. Some argue that the creditor-debtor long term relationship arises from the valuable "inside information" revealed via.
This volume brings together the most innovative and important work on implicit contract theory, a key area of research which has developed over the past 20 years. Implicit contract theory is concerned with the workings of the macro-labour market over business cycles and focuses on a series of key questions including, how economists can explain unemployment levels and employment fluctuations.
An implicit contract is a theoretical construct meant to describe complex agreements, written and tacit, between employers and employees, which govern the exchange of labour services when various types of job-specific investments inhibit labour mobility and opportunities to shed risk are limited by imperfectly developed markets for contingent claims.
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION. March 3, I. NFORMATION. Information as an economic good B. Imperfect but symmetric information does not lead to inefficiency II. ORAL. AZARD (E. XAMPLE: F. IRE. NSURANCE) A. Definition B. Efficient outcomes C. Why the market does not yield efficient outcomes D.
A little on the market outcome E. implicit contracts but not in the context of credit markets. The recent work by Stiglitz and Weiss (, ) adopts an approach which is superficially similar to ours. It is worthwhile considering the differences in their assump- tions and results. We assume that asymmetric information.
Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy; the Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs, Review of Economic Studies, 52, pagesBursting Bubbles: A Note on the Rationality of Hyperinflations in Optimizing Models, Journal of.
The models sum up the constraints imposed by the prevailing institutional setting through a contract, either explicit or implicit. They make intensive use of noncooperative game theory with asymmetric information. The Economics of Contracts introduces graduate students and nonspecialist professional economists to the theory of contracts.
Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information. Borrowers With Different Wealth Endowments The Role of the Horizontal Integration of the Banking Firm Implicit Contracts and as an Incentive Device Experience Rating of Borrowers Rationing With Endogenous Costs of Default Bankruptcy as a Joint.
Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse. Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden. Finance Research Letters,vol. 1, issue 1, Date: References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc Citations: View citations in EconPapers () Track citations by RSS feed.
Downloads.Sharpe, S.A. () Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending, and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships. Journal of Finance, 45, has been cited by the following article: TITLE: Relationship between Banks’ Capital and Credit Risk-Taking through Syndicated Loan.Information asymmetry.
The discussion in this section of the book examines how equilibrium credit rationing can arise in situations of asymmetric information. A good example of information asymmetry between the borrower and the lender is the borrower's propensity to default on mortgage payments.